However there has been no research done on the impact of corruption on bank lending. This gap is surprising considering the strong link between law enforcement and corruption. Indeed, corruption reduces law enforcement by rendering more difficult the functioning of courts and more generally of public administration taking care of the application of laws. 2 Nevertheless the similarities between the consequences for bank lending of law enforcement and corruption are misleading, as they only consider judiciary corruption. Corruption is not limited to the misuse of public office, as made clear in its usual definition as provided by Transparency International: "the misuse of entrusted power for private gain". It can also take place in lending through bribes given to bank officials to receive a loan, as observed by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2006) and Barth et al. (2008) .
Law enforcement plays a role in bank credit, as the ability of banks to enforce their claims against defaulting borrowers enhances their willingness to lend. Corruption is similarly expected to reduce banks' willingness to lend, as it is associated with greater uncertainty of enforcement of lenders' claims in courts in case of default.
While corruption in public administration is expected to have a negative impact on bank credit, the role of corruption in lending is not straightforward. It can be viewed as an obstacle to finance, as it acts as a tax on loans for borrowers by increasing the cost of the loan. However, this argument assumes that the bribe is required by the bank official and yet the borrower may take the initiative to propose a bribe to enhance his chances to receive the loan. In the latter case, corruption may favor bank lending and hence have a different impact than other legal dimensions such as law enforcement.
We examine the validity based on macro and micro evidence of these two contrasting views of the effect of corruption on bank lending. We perform a countrylevel analysis to investigate the influence of corruption at the macro level, in line with the cross-country papers on the determinants of bank lending (e.g. Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007) . We can thus check whether corruption exerts a similar impact on bank lending as do other institutional factors.
We then turn to a bank-level investigation to check on and delve deeper into our macro findings. The positive impact of corruption on lending is dependent of the borrowers' willingness to give bribes to obtain a loan. This behavior appears more likely in the presence of greater risk aversion by banks, leading to more rejected loan applications. We therefore test whether the degree of bank risk aversion affects the impact of corruption on bank lending. Furthermore, even if corruption favors bank lending by reducing banks' reluctance to grant loans, it may not be beneficial for economic growth, if it merely expands the volume of bad loans. Indeed borrowers may give bribes to bank officials only to obtain excessively risky loans. As a consequence, we check whether the effect of corruption on bank lending differs according with the quality of loans.
We thereby contribute to the literature on determinants of bank lending, but we also provide a significant contribution to the literature on corruption. Indeed this burgeoning literature has analyzed a wide range of consequences of corruption (e.g. productivity, Wei, 2000, on foreign direct investment), but never, to our knowledge, for bank lending. In this literature, the argument that corruption may be positively associated with bank credit can be related to the "grease the wheels hypothesis" according to which corruption may be beneficial in a second best world by alleviating the distortions caused by ill-functioning institutions (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968 ).
This hypothesis considers that an inefficient public administration constitutes a major impediment to economic activity and that a dose of "greasing" money may help circumvent. As a consequence, corruption may be less detrimental, or even beneficial, in countries plagued by defective bureaucracy. Under similar reasoning, our investigation checks whether corruption may grease the wheels of banks plagued with excessive risk aversion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the elements from the literature that may be related to the impact of corruption on bank lending.
Section III develops our empirical investigation at the country level. In section IV, we report the empirical tests at the bank level. We then provide some concluding remarks in section V.
II. Corruption and bank lending linkages
The key argument as to why corruption should hamper bank credit is based on the law and finance theory pioneered by La Porta et al. (1997) . Legal institutions protecting banks and enforcing contracts are likely to encourage greater bank credit, by increasing banks' willingness to grant loans. In case of default by a borrower, the bank may wish to force repayment, to grab collateral or even to take control of the borrower, in the case of a corporate loan. Therefore, the institutions that empower the bank to take such actions exert an influence on the lending behavior. As corruption adds to uncertainty for banks to enforce their claims against defaulting borrowers, it should diminish their willingness to lend.
Empirical evidence supports the role of laws on the books and of law enforcement on bank credit. While La Porta et al. (1997) observe that better legal protection of creditors favors large-size debt markets, Levine (1998 Levine ( , 1999 and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) show that better legal protection of lenders is associated with a higher ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP in crosscountry analyses. By investigating the legal determinants of loan contract characteristics, Qian and Strahan (2007) also provide some support for this view with the finding that stronger protection of creditors on the books leads to lower loan rates charged by banks.
While the latter argument focuses on judicial corruption, another argument for a detrimental impact of corruption on bank credit deals with corruption in lending.
Indeed, corruption can also take place through bribes given to bank officials to receive a loan. Levin and Satarov (2000) notably explain how borrowers gave envelopes filled with cash to bank officials in Russia in the 1990s. Evidence of corruption in lending is widespread. In Russia, Levin and Satarov (2000) report figures on criminal cases launched against employees of Russian banks in the 1990s. The above-mentioned arguments share the presumption that corruption may hamper bank credit. But corruption in lending might also be beneficial for bank credit in some cases. Indeed the argument according to which corruption in lending hiders bank credit considers that the bank official exploits his power in loan granting by demanding a bribe in exchange, which increases the cost of the loan. Nevertheless, the borrower may also be inclined to give a bribe to the bank official to enhance his chances to obtain a loan. In that case, corruption in lending may favor bank credit, as corruption "greases" bank lending.
Borrowers' incentives to offer bribes to obtain bank credit should increase with bank risk aversion. As risk aversion deals with the reluctance of banks to grant loans, greater risk aversion means more rejected loan applications. As a consequence, it increases the likelihood that borrowers would pay bribes to receive loans. A theoretical argument can also be advanced to motivate the positive impact of corruption in lending on bank credit. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have indeed shown that adverse selection, resulting from ex ante asymmetry information between bank and borrower causes credit rationing in the sense that borrowers willing to pay greater loan rates than requested have rejected loan applications. The bank is motivated to do so to avoid adverse selection through attracting only bad borrowers. Nevertheless, the existence of credit rationing suggests that some borrowers are willing to pay more than the loan rate to obtain credit. As a consequence, they have incentives to pay bribes to bank officials to obtain the loan. One important point however is that only risky borrowers have an incentive to behave like this, in accord with the adverse selection mechanism. Indeed the safe borrowers are not willing to pay more. In that sense, by circumventing the obstacles to obtain a loan from the bank, corruption in lending might increase bank lending by favoring only bad loans. 
III. Country-level analysis
This section examines the empirical impact of corruption on bank credit at the country level. To this end, we proceed to cross-country regressions of bank credit on a set of variables including corruption and a wide range of control variables.
III.1 Estimation approach
The explained variable is Bank Credit, defined as the ratio of total credit issued to private enterprises by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP.
The data are from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and . This variable is widely Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in table 1. Tables 2 and 3 In addition, all control variables are either intuitively signed or insignificant. We observe that Inflation is significantly negative, which is in line with the conclusion of of corruption on bank development is not driven by either subsample. Indeed we observe this finding for both groups of countries and so conclude that corruption weakens bank credit in both developed and developing countries.
III.2 Results

IV. Bank-level analysis
We have shown above that corruption hampers bank lending at the country level. But corruption in lending could enhance bank lending in some cases. This may indeed result from the eagerness of borrowers to obtain loans. In that case, corruption may contribute to increase bank lending. Such behavior should be particularly relevant in situations in which bank managers are risk-averse, as greater risk aversion reduces borrowers' chances of obtaining loans and thus strengthens their incentive to pay bribes. We now turn to a bank-level analysis to investigate these questions.
IV.1 Estimation approach
The purpose of the bank-level investigation is twofold: to check the relevance of country-level results and to analyze whether the effect of corruption on lending is dependent on bank risk aversion. We use bank-level data from the Bankscope database of BVD-IBCA. In investigating the propensity of banks to grant loans, the explained variable is the ratio of loans to total assets (Loans to Assets). The explanatory variable of primary concern is again corruption, as defined as above. We use three bank-level control variables to control for bank characteristics. The ratio of deposits to total assets (Deposits to Assets) is included in the estimations, as the sources of financing can influence banks' lending behavior. Furthermore, we take into account bank size, measured as the logarithm of total assets (Size), owing to possible differences in activities between small and big banks. , which use the ratio of equity to total assets to measure banks' risk aversion. Indeed this latter ratio is a measure of capitalization rather than risk aversion, as it does not take regulation on minimum equity into account. Therefore, we improve this measure of risk aversion by considering only equity in excess to prudential minima.
We also include several country-level variables described above to control for the macroeconomic environment: Inflation, GDP per capita, and the legal origin variables. Dummy variables for each year are also included, to control for yearly effects. We adopt the Tukey box plot based on interquartile range to eliminate outliers from the sample. Banks with observations outside the range defined by the first and third quartiles that are greater or less than twice the interquartile range were eliminated for each ratio employed (loans to assets, deposits to assets, risk aversion).
Our sample then included 30,520 observations (bank-year) on banks located in 98
countries. Descriptive statistics of the bank-level variables are displayed in table 1.
IV.2 Results
We start the bank-level estimations with a series of regressions of bank lending, reported in table 5. We use alternatively both corruption measures and two sets of control variables to check the sensitivity of the results. The key finding is the significantly negative coefficient of the corruption variable, which means that banks in countries with greater corruption have a lower ratio of loans to total assets. This supports, at bank-level, our conclusion for the country-level that corruption induces banks to lend less. We now turn to a second set of estimations, in which we seek to examine whether the degree of bank risk aversion exerts an impact on banks' lending behavior.
We consequently add an interaction term between corruption and degree of risk aversion in the estimations displayed in table 6 . We observe that the coefficient of The coefficient of the corruption variable is negative and significant in all estimations, meaning that corruption reduces the share of performing loans in assets.
This result is in line with our finding that corruption reduces the share of loans in assets. However the key finding again is a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term between corruption index and bank risk aversion, while the coefficient for the corruption index is significantly negative. This suggests that corruption is less detrimental to the ratio of performing loans to assets when bank risk aversion is greater.
As a consequence, our findings do not support the view that corruption may favor bank lending only by increasing bad loans. Nevertheless, the coefficient of the corruption variable is greater in absolute value in the estimations explaining the performing loans to assets ratio than in those for the loans to assets ratio. This finding suggests that corruption hampers good loans more than bad loans. To dig deeper into these results, we compute the overall effect of the corruption index on the ratio of performing loans to total assets. We again focus on the estimation with the CPI measure of corruption. As the coefficient for Corruption is -0.042 and the coefficient for the interaction term is 0.255, the overall coefficient for the corruption index is positive for values of Risk Aversion greater than 0.042 / 0.255 ≅ 0.165. Only 1.1% of the observations have values of Risk Aversion greater than this threshold. This means that corruption increases the ratio of performing loans to assets for some banks with high risk aversion. Nevertheless, corruption does raise this ratio for far less banks than was the case for the ratio of loans to assets.
This is an important result in terms of welfare, as it supports the view that corruption may favor lending of good loans in the case of great risk aversion.
Consequently, as financial development has been shown to promote growth (e.g. to grant loans, owing to risk aversion. This finding can be related to the "grease the wheels" hypothesis, according to which corruption may be beneficial in a second best world. While this hypothesis is based on the idea that corruption helps circumvent impediments induced by inefficient public administration, we provide support regarding how corruption helps circumvent bank risk aversion to obtain loans. In this sense, corruption greases the wheels of bank lending.
V. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyze the effect of corruption on bank lending. This neglected issue is at the crossroad of the literature on the consequences of corruption and that on the determinants of bank credit. As bank lending has been shown to favor growth, such probing furthers our understanding of the potential effects of corruption on economic development.
At first glance, corruption is expected to hamper bank lending, as corruption is associated with less protection of creditors. Nevertheless, this view only considers judicial corruption, while corruption in lending may be beneficial for bank credit if bribes given to bank employees favor the granting of the loan. Corruption greasing the wheels of banks is more likely if banks have great risk aversion, leading to more rejected loan applications.
Country-level estimations are favorable to the view that corruption hampers bank lending. Therefore macro evidence supports a similar influence of corruption on bank credit as one finds for legal determinants such as law on the books or law enforcement (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007) . At first glance, bank-level estimations confirm this finding with a negative impact of corruption on bank lending.
However additional estimations show a subtler impact, as the detrimental role of corruption is weakened when bank risk aversion increases. Corruption may be beneficial for bank lending for some high levels of bank risk aversion. In addition, we observe that corruption does not increase bank credit by favoring only bad loans.
We obtain empirical results that qualify the consensual view on the negative effects of corruption, by showing that corruption softens the financing constraints resulting from bank risk aversion. This finding that corruption greases bank officials to help borrowers to obtain loans may be related to the "grease the wheels hypothesis", according to which corruption may alleviate distortions caused by illfunctioning institutions. While this hypothesis was developed to explain how corruption may circumvent inefficiencies from defective public administration, our rationale is that corruption helps to obviate possible inefficiencies due to excessively risk-averse banks.
A possible policy implication of our findings is that countries with highly riskaverse banks may benefit in terms of increased bank lending from allowing for an expansion in corruption. This inference is however risky and incorrect. Corruption does not exert an impact on growth solely through bank credit and is thus likely to hamper growth. Furthermore, a high degree of bank risk aversion hampers bank lending and may be influenced by well-designed policies. Therefore, encouraging countries to fight corruption by considering also how to reduce excessive bank riskaversion constitutes a safer option for enhancing bank lending. Future work could well broaden and deepen our understanding of the impact of corruption on bank lending. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for years are included but are not reported.
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